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„The Impact of Blockchain Technology on the Trustworthiness of Online Voting 
Systems“  - „Elections and Trust“ 
 
Abstract 
Online Voting evidently increases election turnouts. However, recent state-owned initiatives 
have failed due to security concerns and a lack of trust in the systems. Blockchain seems to be 
a very suitable technical solution to establish transparency in online voting and thus, create 
trust. We have built our own, blockchain-enabled voting platform and utilized it to run an A/B-
testing experiment at a university election to investigate its effect. Our results show that students 
trusted the blockchain-based voting version less than the control version. However, literature 
and our focus group findings revealed that there is an interrelation between the distrust among 
the students and a low level of familiarity with blockchain technology. Hence, we conclude that 
people should be educated before being confronted with blockchain-enabled online voting to 
take advantage of the technology’s potential. 
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According to Russell and Zamfir (2018), participation rates in parliamentary elections dropped 
by more than 10% globally between 1980 and 2018. To take countermeasures against this trend, 
online voting turned out to be a promising idea. Breux et al. (2017) found evidence that online 
voting actually increases election turnouts by especially encouraging less committed voters. 
Unfortunately, various, state-run initiatives to implement online voting have failed. The 
Netherlands forbade electronic counting of votes due to a strong fear of cyberattacks (Lowe, 
2019) and France stopped all ongoing initiatives because of similar motivations (Reuters, 
2018). The only exception remains Estonia, which already enabled online voting in 
parliamentary elections since 2005. In 2019, for the first time in history, it became the most 
popular channel to cast a vote with 44% of all participating voters using it (Krivonosova, 2019). 
However, what seems to be missing to expand the implementation of online voting 
systems is the right technology. Both, the responsible authorities and the broad population have 
to trust their voting system to enable a successful transformation. Spycher et al. (2011) 
identified transparency as the most crucial factor for establishing trust in online voting systems. 
In achieving this, Dogo et al. (2018) stress that blockchain technology establishes strong 
perceived transparency. Our implied research hypothesis therefore states that introducing 
blockchain technology to online voting system does actually increase the trust in this system. 
This hypothesis turns into our research question: To what extent the use of blockchain 
technology actually impacts the trustworthiness of online voting systems? 
With the goal of investigating the answer, we built our own, blockchain-based online 
voting system, called Votechain, to run an expedient experiment. It technically works on a 
blockchain protocol and enables voters to cast their ballot online and verify it afterwards. 
Hereby, the voters are given access to the entire blockchain of the particular election they are 
participating in, in an encrypted manner. Each block represents one vote.  
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Votechain has been utilized in a students’ elections encompassing almost 1000 votes out 
of which roughly every second student actively participated in our A/B-Testing experiment. 
The main goal of this experiment was to investigate, whether students who were prompted with 
a visualization of the election blockchain after they cast their vote would actually trust this 
online voting system more than the control group, to which state-of-the-art security methods 
were shown instead. 
This research paper starts off with an extensive literature review including an elaboration 
about the nature of elections, voting methods and the transition to online voting. Continuation 
of the literature review can be found in Konzok (2020) who discusses blockchain technology 
and in Riedlberger (2020) who elaborates on blockchain-based voting. Thereafter, Riedlberger 
(2020) describes methods we used, while this paper presents the experiment’s results in the 
results section as well as adequate statistical analysis. The discussion of the results is presented 
in Konzok (2020).  
2. Literature Review 
Our literature review is split into three sections and represents our individual contributions to 
the master thesis. Nina Vysna created the first section — Elections and trust — that is part of 
this document. Ivo Konzok developed the second section — An exploration of blockchain 
technology — and Kevin Riedlberger wrote the third section — Blockchain-enabled online 
voting. These parts are included in separate papers, Konzok (2020) and Riedlberger (2020). 
 
Individual Contribution 
2.1 Elections and trust 
Elections are undoubtedly one of the cornerstones of any democratic society, as they allow 
ordinary citizens to participate in political decisions (Currin-Percival, 2010). When they work 
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well, they can deepen civic engagement, inform public debate and hold those in power 
accountable (Wojtasik, 2013; Norris and Grömping, 2019). In the recent years however, issues 
around elections have received a lot of attention in the global media, particularly after the US 
presidential elections in 2016. Russian actors are believed to have breached the elections’ 
security and accessed the voter registration systems and state websites, compromising at least 
21 U.S. states prior to the elections. Even though the U.S. intelligence services concluded that 
no votes have been altered, hackers were able to steal hundreds of thousands of voters’ personal 
information among other ways of interfering (Abrams, 2019). Alarmingly, in a study conducted 
two weeks prior to the 2016 elections, researchers found that only 35% of Americans were very 
confident that their vote would be casted correctly (McCarthy and Clifton, 2016). According to 
the Elections Integrity Project 2019, fears of foreign meddling together with online 
disinformation and fake news are on top of the list of most pressing issues that challenge the 
perception of elections’ integrity. These issues are not exclusive to the USA, but are rather a 
global phenomenon as foreign interference have been reported in Europe as well, for example 
in the Brexit referendum campaign (Norris and Grömping, 2019).  
According to Fowler, democracy only works if the elections results are perceived as 
legitimate (Morgan, 2018). In order to perceive the outcome of elections as legitimate, voters 
have to trust the electoral process (Anderson, 2005). To prevent democracy from being 
undermined, it is therefore essential to investigate how trust in electoral systems can be 
improved.  
Our research contribution in this paper focuses on the trustworthiness of voting 
methods. Even though we provide an overview of all major election technologies, we chose to 
focus on the electronic methods and especially online voting technologies. Despite the 
advantages of online elections detailed below and digital transformation affecting all parts of 
the society, including elections, these systems face a lot of distrust. The existing skepticism is 
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however not withot valid reasons and our goal is to understand and find ways to reduce them. 
Specifically, we will explore the utility of emerging blockchain technologies to increase trust 
in online voting systems.  
In this first part of our literature review we discuss the general requirements for voting 
systems, different methods of voting, and issues concerning the trustworthiness of these 
methods.   
2.1.1 Election requirements 
For a voting technology to be considered eligible for use in elections, it has to fulfil specific 
legal and constitutional requirements that aim to preserve democracy. Table 1 summarizes the 
most relevant requirements mentioned in current literature (Aranha and van de Graaf, 2018; 
Mursi et al., 2013; Lambrinoudakis et al., 2003; Mitrou et al., 2003; Gritzalis, 2002). According 
to Lambrinoudakis et al. (2003), requirements fall into two groups: security and system-wide 
requirements. Some requirements are further decomposed into several sub-attributes. 
Table 1: Compilation of election requirements 
Security requirements 
Accuracy - inalterability - no one can change another person’s vote 
- completeness - all valid votes are included in the final count 
- soundness - no invalid vote is included 
Democracy - eligibility - only eligible voters can place a vote 
- unreusability - each voter can cast only one vote and cannot 
vote instead of anyone else 
Privacy/secrecy - voters cannot be linked back to their vote; their election 




Robustness - allowing abstention - voters have option to not cast their vote 
- preventing misbehaviour - preventing voters or election 
authorities to invalidate the result of the election maliciously 
Verifiability/Audab
ility 
- universal/public verifiability - anyone can verify the election 
results 
- individual verifiability - voters can verify that their individual 
vote has been cast as intended and counted in the final tally 
Freedom/Uncoerca
bility 
- voters free to form their opinion and to express it without 
being threatened, pressured or manipulated 
Fairness - results only revealed when no one can vote anymore 
Declarability - possibility to find out if the voter participated or not 




Reliability - resistance towards any randomly occurring malfunctions 
User Friendliness - easy to use system for all demographic groups 
Equality - equal access - each demographic group has access to the 
election technology and/or to the polling stations 
- ‘one voter one vote’ principle - each vote counts equally 
towards the election result 
Voter convenience - possibility to cast a vote quickly and easily 
Voter mobility - possibility to cast a vote regardless of voter’s location 
Flexibility - multiple different question formats, e.g. open-ended questions 
Efficiency - determined by performance (time needed for one person to 
vote) and complexity of the underlying technology 
- creates an upper limit to the scalability – number of 
participants able to cast their ballot in a given time period 
with given resources  
Transparency - all parties able to understand the election system and establish 





2.1.2 Voting methods and their main issues 
While there are many stages in the voting process, from recruiting poll workers to the final 
tabulation of results, here we focus on the process of casting a ballot itself and we summarize 
the methods that have been used around the globe for this purpose. Concerning this stage, it is 
important to define a few relevant terms. Election is a formal and organized choice by vote of 
a person for a political office or other position. A vote is an answer of an election participant to 
a certain question, each question with a set of answers or candidates is a race and a ballot is a 
structure that consists of one or more votes. A voting scheme/system is any method or a protocol 
that has mechanisms to receive votes as input and to produce the sum of those votes as an output 
and thus manages elections (Mursi et al., 2013).  
2.1.2.1 Traditional voting systems 
Although the mass proliferation of digital technology through all aspects of society has led to 
the digitization of certain elections, the majority of the world’s national elections are still held 
using traditional paper-ballot systems. Such ballots have pre-printed names of qualified 
candidates in a uniform order and they are counted by hand. Tally teams responsible for 
counting the votes are generally composed of members representing all competing parties. This 
is a major weakness of the paper-ballot system, as more experienced tally counters can bias the 
counting in their favour if the counters of the opposing party are more naive or less experienced. 
This can in turn threaten the accuracy requirement of the elections (Jones, 2003).  
 Another voting scheme commonly used in the United States is the optical mark-sense 
system. Poll workers use an optical scanner to register the choice of the voter marked on a paper 
ballot. Results of the count are stored electronically. They can be recounted as the system has 
a paper audit trail (Gambhir and Karsten, 2019). The main drawback of this system is that voters 
might use the wrong marking implement or wrong type of mark, which can lead to miscounts 
of votes (Jones, 2003), as was the case in Florida during the 2000 US presidential elections. 
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Punch card systems, which were also notorious for causing the miscount and subsequent 
recount in the 2000 US Presidential Election, have since been abandoned (Franzen, 2001; 
Agresti and Presnell 2002). 
2.1.2.2 Electronic voting systems 
The first fully computerized voting scheme, Direct Recording Electronic System (DRE) is used 
in multiple countries around the world. Examples include Brazil, India, Venezuela or the United 
States. European countries that used to have electronic voting machines in the past such as 
Germany, Netherlands and Ireland, abolished the system (Nikolov, 2019). In such systems,  
voters receive a PIN or a smart card from the election officials, that is inserted into the DRE 
machine (a computer connected to a network with an uninterruptible power supply placed in a 
voting booth), which has a touch screen. The election choice is then recorded digitally by the 
computer‘s memory (Lauer, 2004; Mursi et al., 2013).  
One drawback of the DRE, is despite its  redundant storage, the storage is created by the 
same software as the original count and therefore it is impossible to conduct an independent 
and reliable recount (Lauer, 2004; Jones, 2003). There are also systems called DRE - VVPAT 
(Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails) that enable users to print out the physical  proof of vote for 
the election participants (Mursi et al., 2013). Even though this feature enhances audibility, it 
does not prevent potential tampering with the machines’ software in the first place (Lauer, 
2004).  
2.1.2.3 Remote voting systems 
Jones (2003) defines remote voting, that can either be postal or electronic, as an election in 
which the participants are „not constrained to vote at designated polling places on the election 
day“ (p.13). Remote electronic voting (also called i-voting, online or internet voting) enables 
elections participants to cast their vote from any digital device connected to a public network. 
Ballots are then transmitted to the election authorities via the Internet (Oppliger et al. 2008).  
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Decreasing voter turnout is often stated as the reason to introduce voting that does not 
require physical presence and thus makes voting more convenient (Oppliger et al. 2008). 
Around the world, the average participation in national parliamentary elections decreased from 
76% to 66% from 1980 to 2018 (Russell and Zamfir, 2018).  Breux et al. (2017) found that 
remote voting indeed encourages election participation among less committed voters as has 
been stated in our introduction. A case study in Ontario evidently proved this finding (Goodman 
and Stokes, 2018). Additional benefits that justify the use of remote electronic voting in specific 
were summarized by Zada et al. (2016) as follows: „verifiability, speed of tallying ballots, 
reduced administration and wastage of resources and time, and vote casting validation“ (p.117). 
In most countries, remote voting is only an additional and exceptional option for 
exercising voting rights (Mitrou et al., 2003), available for eligible voters with a valid reason 
for not being able to attend the official polling station, such as residing abroad. However, 
making remote voting (and specifically online voting) merely a supplementary option hinders 
“the interest for innovation and for technologically supported participation in political 
processes” (Mitrou et al.,2003, p.47). The only country where online voting is available on a 
country-wide scale for all eligible voters in parliamentary elections is at the moment Estonia.  
 Postal and online voting share some flaws stemming from the vote being cast in the 
voter’s private environment rather than in a traditional booth in a public polling station 
(Krimmer & Volkamer, 2005).  The voters themselves are the ones that need to ensure that the 
principles of free and private elections are protected, instead of the polling station workers. 
Although remote voting does not introduce problems related to privacy - voter coercion (forcing 
someone to vote in a certain way) and vote buying (paying someone to vote in a certain way) – 
they may be magnified due to a potential attacker’s extended reach and ability to verify the 
voters’ actions  (Jules et al., 2010).   
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Online voting is often claimed to be insecure by design and experts warn against the 
danger of malicious hardware and software that could impact elections (Finogina, 2018). 
Personal electronic devices can be affected by viruses and worms, while servers can be affected 
by various cyber-attacks, e.g. denial-of-service (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 
and Medicine, 2018). Another problem of online voting is the ‘digital divide’, which can be 
explained as implicit exclusion of certain demographic groups (poor, elderly, particular ethnic 
groups) who do not have the same access to and/or understanding of the underlying technology 
(Peralta, 2003).  
2.1.3 Current voting systems, transparency and trust 
Each voting system has a number of flaws with the potential to endanger one or more election 
requirements outlined in section 2.1.1. It would be subjective to claim that certain requirements 
are more important than others and thus certain election systems are better than others.  
Morover, according to Past (2019), security of elections is not a technical problem as attempts 
for election meddling have happened frequently throughout history, regardless of the system 
used.  Since no system and its underlying technology guarantees bulletproof security, it is 
crucial to manage the risks of the chosen system and build up voters’ confidence that their vote 
is cast and counted correctly. 
 As previously mentioned, trust of voters into the electoral system is crucial for results 
to be considered legitimate and thus for preserving democracy. Bernhard et al. (2017)  points 
out that for election results to be seen as legitimate, they must be convincing to all and especially 
to losers so there is no valid ground for challenging it.  Norris (2014) and Bernhard et al. (2017) 
also found that when citizens suspect that electoral malpractice is common, they are less likely 
to participate in elections. However, not much research has focused on establishing which 
systems are most trusted by the voters and why. The existing research is also rather 
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inconclusive, perhaps because the trusting beliefs of voters frequently shift depending on the 
news coverage and controversies surrounding a particular voting technology (McGaley and 
Gibson, 2006).  
 Voters’ trust can be defined as the confidence that the voter’s ballot has been cast and 
counted correctly (Alvarez and Hall, 2004; Alvarez et al., 2008). The few studies regarding 
voters’ trust in election technologies have mostly been focused on the American voters and 
have produced conflicting results. Atkeson and Saunders (2007) found that absentee (postal) 
voting leads to lower voter confidence. They also emphasized that voter confidence is 
significantly impacted by voters’ level of belief that the technology used produces verifiable 
results. Alvarez et al. (2008) found that any other technology than paper ballot seems to 
decrease voter confidence. Stewart et al. (2010) researched voters’ preferences in the states of 
New Jersey and Virginia and the results suggest that most people prefer to vote on electronic 
machines, less with optical scan machines and least with hand counted paper ballots. Claassen 
et al. (2013) on the other hand found that voters trust optical scanners more than electronic 
machines. The latest survey held in the USA by the University of Chicago Harris School of 
Public Policy and The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs (2018) reports that 
Americans have most confidence in electronic machines that provide paper receipts, less in 
optically scanned paper ballots and least of them trust electronic machines without a paper trail. 
This survey further suggests that only 28 percent of Americans would be in favor of using an 
online voting system or the exclusive use of mail-in ballots.  
 Smith (2016) researched trust in voting technology among Australian citizens and found 
that they have the most trust in the voting systems they are most familiar with - paper ballots. 
They are also reasonably confident that remote electronic voting would produce accurate 
election results if it was introduced. In addition, he found that young voters are more positive 
about electronic elections than older voters. Research is quite conflicted in this topic as some 
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studies support this finding (Avgerou et al.,2009; Stewart, 2009)  while other studies suggest 
that young people trust electronic voting less than older voters since they have more knowledge 
about the technology and its potential pitfalls (Alvarez et al., 2008; Delwit et al., 2005). 
 A study from Switzerland, where electronic voting has been tested in multiple elections 
since 2004, found that trust is a very important prerequisite for the adoption of electronic voting 
systems (Fragnière et al., 2019). Voters consider secrecy combined with individual verifiability 
crucial for their ability to trust the system. In addition, participants of this study offered an 
interesting insight: voters are more willing to forgive a human error that occurs in paper ballot 
elections than a computer error. According to the respondents in this study, an average person 
does not have the capacity to understand a computer error and thus to empathisize with it. 
Lheureux de Freitas and Macadar (2017) similarly found that in Brazil, where electronic voting 
has been in use since 1996, voters simply do not understand the election process suggesting that 
low transparency is a significant weakness of such systems. 
 Indeed, number of authors agree that the lack of transparency is a great challenge for 
electronic voting. For instance, Gritzalis (2002) suggest that the inherent distrust in such voting 
systems is due to their lack of transparency. Lauer (2004) further argues that while paper ballot 
system place trust in the government, electronic voting systems place trust in the hands of the 
third parties that make the technology, and the technology itself with its little transparency. In 
contrast, the paper ballot voting process is easily comprehensible and people can use common 
sense to look for potential fraud (Schoenmakers, 2000). Zollinger et al. (2019) also support the 
idea that people trust paper ballot systems more because they understand all the steps involved. 
Being familiar with the used technology and understanding it plays an important role in 
perceived trustworthiness of the election system (Avgerou et al., 2009).   In Germany for 
instance, electronic voting was claimed unconstitutional in 2005 as an average voter without 
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any prior knowledge in the matter, should be able to understand the whole voting process 
(Weiler, 2018). 
Trust evidently plays a crucial role in the use of all electronic voting systems and its 
acceptance (McGaley and Gibson, 2006). Transparency that allow voters to directly observe 
and understand the processes involved in casting the votes and their consequent tallying seem 
to be the key concept for elections to be perceived as genuine and trustworthy (Enguehard, 
2008). This is problematic for electronic voting systems that suffer from low transparency as 
opposed to traditional paper ballot systems. It therefore seems that if governments want to reap 
the advantages of e-voting systems - and more specifically its online version that allows citizens 
to vote remotely - such as higher turnout, or faster and less wasteful process, they need to 
increase transparency of such systems, among other things.  
In the following chapter 2.2, we investigate if blockchain technology has the potential 
to increase transparency and hence to be the solution for the trust issues that hinder adoption of 
online election technologies. 
 
Group Contribution 
Please find Methods in Riedlberger (2020) and Discussion in Konzok (2020). 
 
3. Results 
Out of 3127 students of Nova SBE who were eligible for voting, 967 decided to cast their vote, 
making it the highest turnout in ten years (see Figure 1). Versions A and B of the application 
were alternately distributed among the subjects based on the previous voter’s version; 483 
received version A and 484 saw version B. 454 out of 967 voters filled in the survey (response 
rate = 46.9%); 242 of them belonging to the control group (no blockchain) and 212 belonging 





Figure 1: Voter Turnout of the Student Representatives Election at Nova SBE (2016-2019) 
 
The demographic distributions of the overall surveyed sample and the respective groups can be 
found below, in Table 2. Majority of the sample was male (56.17%), white (93.39%), aged 
between 18 and 24 (83.04%), and Portuguese (64.54%). Other prominent nationalities that 
participated in the survey, other than Portuguese were German (16.74%) and Italian (6.39%). 








p-value (imbalance        
t-test) 
Gender Male 56.17% 50.83% 62.26% 0.014** 
 Female 43.61% 49.17% 37.26% 0.011** 
Age Under 18 0.66% 1.24% 0.00% 0.104 
 18-24 83.04% 82.64% 83.49% 0.811 
 25-34 15.64% 15.29% 16.04% 0.827 
 35-44 0.44% 0.83% 0.00% 0.185 
 45-54 0.22% 0.00% 0.47% 0.286 
Program Masters 72.25% 70.66% 74.06% 0.421 
 Bachelors 22.25% 22.73% 21.70% 0.793 
 Ph.D. 5.07% 5.79% 4.25% 0.457 
 Other 0.44% 0.83% 0.00% 0.185 
Nationality Portuguese 64.54% 61.16% 68.40% 0.108 
 German 16.74% 19.01% 14.15% 0.167 
 Italian 6.39% 7.85% 4.72% 0.174 
 Other 12.33% 11.98% 12.74% 0.809 
Race White 93.39% 90.91% 96.23% 0.023** 
 Asian 1.54% 1.24% 1.89% 0.583 
 Black 1.32% 2.48% 0.00% 0.021** 
 Other 3.74% 5.37% 1.89% 0.051* 
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By analysing the descriptive statistics across the two groups (reported in Table 3), we see 
that surveyed voters in the control group (non-blockchain application) have higher average 
scores on each construct and almost all sub-constructs than the voters in the treatment group 
(blockchain version). The only exception is faith in general technology, where treatment group 
scores slightly higher on average. The highest average score of 6.41 was measured for sub-
construct functionality in the control group. It is important to note that the average scores of all 
sub-constructs and hence constructs are on the upper end of the spectrum. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the constructs and their sub-constructs 
 Mean Standard dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
Construct / sub-construct A B A B A B A B A B 
Trusting beliefs in specific technology 6.01 5.90 0.64 0.68 6.05 6.00 2.50 3.80 7.00 7.00 
   Reliability 5.86 5.69 0.82 0.91 6.00 5.67 1.67 1.33 7.00 7.00 
   Functionality 6.41 6.37 0.69 0.81 6.50 6.75 2.00 1.75 7.00 7.00 
   Helpfulness 5.61 5.48 1.02 1.06 5.67 5.67 3.00 2.67 7.00 7.00 
Institution-based trust  5.39 5.24 1.10 1.23 5.63 5.50 1.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 
   Situational Normality 5.49 5.30 1.22 1.31 5.75 5.50 1.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 
   Structural Assurance 5.30 5.18 1.15 1.31 5.50 5.50 1.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 
Trust in general technology 5.36 5.35 0.93 0.92 5.43 5.43 1.57 1.71 7.00 7.00 
   Faith in general technology 5.48 5.49 0.99 0.99 5.50 5.75 1.75 2.00 7.00 7.00 
   Trusting Stance 5.20 5.17 1.21 1.19 5.33 5.33 1.00 1.00 7.00 7.00 
 
As mentioned in the Methods section (Riedlberger,2020), we ran the first regression 
model 10 times, to measure the effect of the treatment (blockchain) on each construct and sub-
construct separately while controlling for the imbalanced variables gender and race. Based on 
the outlined theoretical framework, blockchain increases transparency and thus we 
hypothesized that using blockchain should increase trust in online voting systems. In other 
words, we hypothesized that the trusting beliefs in specific technology construct and its sub-
constructs (reliability, functionality, helpfulness) may receive higher scores in the treatment 
group than in the control group. However, the results of the regression analysis do not allow us 
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in trust in our online voting 
system between subjects who received non-blockchain version and those who received 
blockchain version, with the exception of reliability sub-construct. We found the treatment 
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significantly decreases perceived reliability of our voting application with 95% confidence 
(p=0.037). The coefficient is -0.1723, meaning that, on average, subjects who received the 
treatment have a 0.17 units lower average score on reliability items, as compared to those 
without the treatment. For all the other sub-constructs and constructs we did not observe any 
significant effect of the treatment, but it is worth to note that the coefficients of the treatment 
were negative for all constructs and almost all sub-constructs except faith in general technology. 
However, it is unsurprising that the treatment did not have any effect on institution-based trust 
and propensity to trust general technology, as these constructs measure the level of trust 
towards technology in general and towards online voting systems regardless of our voting 
application. We only expected a positive effect of treatment (blockchain) on trusting beliefs in 
specific technology and its sub-constructs. Quite contrary to our hypothesis expectations, the 
results suggest that blockchain has a significant negative effect on perceived reliability of our 
online election system. The coefficients and p-values for Model 1 are reported in Table 4. 
In the second model, we measured the added effects of belonging to a certain nationality, 
gender, education level and of having a different level of trust (both trust in general technology  
 and institution-based trust) on trust in our blockchain enabled voting application and its 
perceived reliability, functionality and helpfulness. We were able to observe a significant 
negative effect for Ph.D. students in reliability, helpfulness and trusting beliefs in specific 
technology. This effect is observed regardless of the treatment, meaning that the effect of being 
a Ph.D. student is on average the same for both control and treatment group. The coefficient is 
however close to zero which implies a relatively little effect. In addition, there were only 23 




Table 4: Model 1 - Regression analyses coefficients and two tailed p-values for all the respective constructs and sub-constructs 
 







based trust  
Faith in general 
technology 




coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Constant 5.875 0.000*** 6.382 0.000*** 5.577 0.000 5.988 0.000*** 5.451 0.000*** 5.246 0.000*** 5.348 0.000*** 5.435 0.000*** 5.123 0.000*** 5.301 0.000*** 
Female -0.083 0.310 0.013 0.863 0.037 0.711 -0.009 0.887 0.024 0.845 0.098 0.406 0.061 0.587 0.057 0.550 0.092 0.423 0.072 0.414 
Black 0.097 0.785 0.364 0.243 0.411 0.340 0.298 0.274 0.708 0.175 -0.320 0.529 0.194 0.688 0.463 0.261 0.346 0.487 0.413 0.280 
Asian 0.616 0.061* -0.023 0.936 0.658 0.099* 0.373 0.138 0.808 0.094* 0.677 0.150 0.743 0.096* 0.186 0.624 0.765 0.096* 0.434 0.218 
Other race 0.362 0.090* 0.249 0.184 0.023 0.928 0.215 0.189 -0.025 0.937 0.440 0.887 0.009 0.974 0.090 0.715 0.167 0.575 0.123 0.590 
Treatment -0.172 0.037** -0.018 0.801 -0.124 0.216 -0.096 0.128 -0.170 0.160 -0.112 0.343 -0.141 0.208 0.029 0.758 -0.002 0.985 0.016 0.858 
                     
Table 5: Model 2, 3 & 4 - Regression analyses coefficients and two tailed p-values for all respective constructs and sub-constructs 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 







based trust  
Faith in general 
technology 




coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Constant 5.985 0.000*** 6.555 0.000*** 5.648 0.000*** 6.112 0.000*** 5.579 0.000*** 5.332 0.000*** 5.455 0.000*** 5.488 0.000*** 5.186 0.000*** 5.358 0.000*** 
Female -0.143 0.196 -0.043 0.658 0.159 0.231 -0.012 0.882 -0.015 0.926 0.156 0.303 0.071 0.619 0.257 0.042** 0.040 0.796 0.164 0.161 
Black -0.083 0.826 0.389 0.240 0.529 0.244 0.289 0.310 0.295 0.580 -0.756 0.147 -0.230 0.638 0.807 0.064* 0.126 0.812 0.515 0.202 
Asian 0.560 0.094* 0.027 0.927 0.718 0.073* 0.394 0.118 0.600 0.202 0.542 0.238 0.571 0.185 0.429 0.262 0.863 0.064* 0.615 0.083* 
Other race 0.319 0.147 0.302 0.117 0.066 0.803 0.236 0.155 -0.121 0.694 -0.053 0.860 -0.087 0.758 0.242 0.338 0.181 0.557 0.216 0.357 
German 0.136 0.379 -0.082 0.544 -0.059 0.749 -0.010 0.932 0.016 0.940 -0.039 0.853 -0.011 0.954 -0.402 0.022** -0.384 0.072* -0.395 0.015** 
Italian 0.000 0.999 -0.225 0.232 0.342 0.184 0.013 0.938 0.072 0.811 -0.056 0.850 0.008 0.976 0.352 0.152 0.342 0.253 0.347 0.127 
Other nation 0.226 0.246 -0.165 0.332 -0.107 0.648 -0.031 0.836 0.298 0.274 0.333 0.210 0.316 0.207 -0.397 0.074* 0.236 0.384 -0.126 0.541 
Bachelors -0.022 0.877 -0.063 0.613 0.040 0.816 -0.020 0.853 -0.070 0.729 0.066 0.738 -0.002 0.992 -0.183 0.264 -0.018 0.929 -0.112 0.460 
Ph.D. -0.541 0.025** -0.124 0.558 -0.923 0.002*** -0.489 0.008*** 0.439 0.196 0.179 0.589 0.309 0.321 -0.430 0.118 -0.091 0.785 -0.285 0.263 
Other program -0.163 0.795 -0.362 0.511 -0.992 0.189 -0.491 0.301 1.216 0.169 0.132 0.878 0.674 0.406 -0.959 0.175 -0.702 0.414 -0.849 0.195 
Gen. tech. neutral -0.060 0.730 -0.042 0.780 0.164 0.431 0.014 0.913 -0.593 0.014** -0.694 0.003*** -0.643 0.004*** - - - - - - 
Gen. tech. low -0.323 0.280 0.058 0.825 -0.211 0.556 -0.137 0.543 -2.032 0.000*** -1.670 0.000*** -1.851 0.000*** - - - - - - 
Inst. tech. neutral -0.202 0.279 -0.191 0.243 -0.658 0.003*** -0.334 0.018** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Inst. tech. low -0.687 0.003*** -0.749 0.000*** -0.420 0.125 -0.632 0.000*** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Treatment -0.215 0.162 0.035 0.797 -0.009 0.961 -0.053 0.645 -0.075 0.720 0.053 0.795 -0.011 0.955 0.199 0.232 0.029 0.886 0.126 0.413 
Female × treatment 0.119 0.473 0.036 0.803 -0.282 0.156 -0.035 0.782 0.026 0.912 -0.186 0.412 -0.080 0.706 -0.486 0.011** 0.141 0.540 -0.217 0.217 
German × treatment -0.221 0.353 0.090 0.665 0.057 0.842 -0.013 0.941 -0.214 0.522 -0.076 0.817 -0.145 0.636 -0.049 0.854 -0.408 0.211 -0.203 0.413 
Italian × treatment 0.305 0.389 -0.037 0.904 -0.631 0.137 -0.113 0.672 0.547 0.272 0.252 0.605 0.399 0.382 -0.217 0.592 -0.126 0.799 -0.178 0.636 
Other nat. × treatment -0.081 0.763 0.061 0.796 0.262 0.418 0.079 0.699 -0.050 0.894 -0.066 0.858 -0.058 0.867 -0.120 0.693 -0.851 0.022** -0.434 0.125 
Bachelors × treatment 0.081 0.694 -0.243 0.180 0.061 0.805 -0.055 0.727 -0.152 0.602 -0.100 0.726 -0.126 0.638 0.118 0.619 0.238 0.411 0.170 0.441 
Ph.D. × treatment 0.390 0.309 -0.276 0.412 0.702 0.127 0.217 0.453 -0.740 0.170 -0.885 0.093 -0.812 0.100 0.769 0.079** 0.178 0.737 0.516 0.203 
Other prog. × treatment 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.062* 0.000 0.878 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.975 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
GTN × treatment -0.111 0.657 -0.416 0.059* -0.943 0.002*** -0.483 0.011*** -0.274 0.432 -0.156 0.647 -0.215 0.501 - - - - - - 
GTL × treatment -0.234 0.626 -0.621 0.141 0.477 0.409 -0.176 0.628 -0.292 0.650 -0.900 0.152 -0.596 0.312 - - - - - - 
ITN × treatment -0.161 0.552 0.127 0.593 0.449 0.168 0.137 0.503 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ITL × treatment 0.326 0.286 0.482 0.072* 0.171 0.640 0.342 0.138 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Notes: significance at: *α = 10%; **α = 5%; ***α = 5%; GTN= general technology neutral; GTL = general technology low; ITN = institutional technology neutral; ITL = institutional technology low. 
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In line with our expectations and with the research of the McKnight et al. (2011), we see 
a significant negative effect of having low/neutral institution-based trust on the trust in specific 
technology and its subconstructs across both control and treatment group, as compared to 
subjects with high institution-based trust. We also see an added negative effect of having 
low/neutral general technology trust on trust in our blockchain based voting application. The 
significance and coefficient for each variable and construct/sub-construct are displayed in Table 
5. For instance, being neutral towards general technology has an added negative effect of -0.51 
units on average on trusting beliefs in our blockchain-based voting application. 
The third model similarly measured the added effects of belonging to a certain nationality, 
gender, education level and of having a different level of trust in general technology on 
institution-based trust and its sub-constructs. As expected, our results suggest that subjects with 
neutral or low general technology trust have significantly lower scores on situational normality, 
structural assurance and institution-based trust than those with high general technology trust. 
This effect is however observed regardless of the treatment; it is the same whether the subjects 
received the blockchain version or not. 
The fourth model measures the added effects of belonging to a certain nationality, gender, 
education level on general technology trust and its sub-constructs. The results suggest that on 
average, Germans have significantly lower scores for faith in general technology, stance 
towards general technology and trust in general technology than Portuguese subjects regardless 
of the treatment, meaning the effect is the same for both control and treatment group. Being 
female also shows significant effect on faith in general technology regardless of the treatment: 
female subjects tend to have an 0.26 units higher average score than males for this sub-
construct. Interaction term between females and treatment is significant as well, however the 
direction of the effect is negative and compounding the coefficients for females, treatment and 
females x treatment variables yields coefficient that is close to zero, thus it is impossible to 
21 
 
make a meaningful interpretation. Regression analysis for stance towards general technology 
shows significant negative effect of interaction variable between other nationality and 
treatment. However, since the variable other nationality combines the scores of 33 different 
nationalities, we did not give this observation much consideration. The coefficients and p-
values for Models 2,3 & 4 are reported in Table 5. 
4. Conclusion 
Blockchain bears high potential to enhance the transparency of online voting systems and 
therefore increase their trustworthiness to drive adoption and higher election turnouts. We 
expected that our A/B-experiment - described in Riedlberger (2020) - would reveal higher 
levels of trust for blockchain-enabled voting in contrast to a two-factor-authentication security 
protocol, which we used for the control group of our experiment. Results presented in this paper 
showed the opposite. Although only one of the seven sub-constructs we applied to measure 
trust showed a significant difference between version A and B, this difference was in favor of 
two-factor-authentication. Students tended to perceive version A (two-factor-authentication) as 
more reliable than version B (blockchain-based). However, we were able to retrieve from 
literature that transparency of online voting systems and familiarity with the utilized technology 
are key enabler of trust, which is supported by our focus group findings. Students agreed that 
blockchain enhances transparency which verifies the technology’s potential for being applied 
in online voting. 
Therefore, we concluded that people have to become more familiar with blockchain 
technology to be able to trust its application, as discussed in Konzok (2020). The right way to 
achieve a widespread technical understanding seems to be educating the population ahead of 
time. Future research should use our findings to set up an experiment, using a representative 
sample and effective education methods, to fundamentally approve blockchain’s potential in 
driving the trustworthiness of online voting systems. In times of decreasing turnouts of 
22 
 
parliamentary elections and a dangerous shift to the right in global politics, the importance of 
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